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1. Introduction 
 There has been considerable empirical and theoretical research devoted to the 
study of models that seek to enhance our understanding of the mechanisms that influence 
economic growth, though not many of them explore how demand and supply forces 
interact to determine growth performance. There is also plenty of empirical evidence that 
technological change comes largely in the form of advances in the manner that capital is 
produced. Arguably, technological innovation leads to some development of new types or 
vintages of capital, and this development is actually an important engine of growth. This 
technological change embodied in the form of new equipment represents phenomena such 
as advances in computer technology, robotization of assembly lines, faster and more 
efficient means of telecommunications, and so on. Meanwhile, investment allocation plays 
quite crucial a role in harvesting the benefits of investment-specific, capital-embodied, 
technical change, with human capital allocation in turn mattering for technological 
adoption and diffusion as well. Indeed, the adoption of embodied technical change is 
likely to require specific human capital in addition to physical capital, and an increase in 
skilled labor facilitates the adoption of new technologies (Greenwood & Yorukoglu 1997). 
 This paper makes an innovative contribution to the literature on growth dynamics 
in two distinct respects. First, it seeks to join these lines of theoretical and empirical 
research on structural factors (to wit, investment-specific technological change and 
accumulation and allocation of both physical and human capital) in a model framework 
which is more inclusive and fully specified as far as the supply side is concerned. In this 
sense, this paper is an innovative step in the direction of uniting the literatures on physical 
and human capital allocation with the original findings of Greenwood, Hercowitz & 
Krusell (1997), as well as of a number of subsequent contributions reported in the 
following section, that investment-specific technological change is a considerable force in 
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explaining the observed growth rates. Second, this more fully specified supply side is 
made to interact with demand factors in a dynamic model of export-led growth, so that 
this paper is also an innovative step in the direction of furthering the understanding of the 
supply constraints to such a demand-driven growth strategy. Intended primarily as it is to 
gain further analytical understanding of the several constraints on growth, the underlying 
presumption of this paper is that there are sizeable increasing returns, on both theoretical 
and empirical grounds, to greater cross-fertilization among these lines of research on 
investment-specific technological change, accumulation and allocation of physical and 
human capital and export-led growth. 
 Indeed, recent advances in the theory of endogenous technological progress have 
led to renewed interest in the relation between international trade, technical change, 
human capital and economic growth. Grossman and Helpman (1991) developed an early 
theoretical articulation of the view that technological progress is the main engine of 
growth and that international trade is a vehicle for technological diffusion. Similarly, in 
the structural economic dynamics approach developed by Pasinetti (1993), which 
nonetheless has a distinctively classical pedigree, the primary source of international gains 
is mobility of knowledge, it being international learning – of outside methods of 
production – that can therefore be claimed to represent the primary source of international 
gains. 
 Several empirical studies have identified channels through which national 
productivity levels are interrelated, emphasizing the role of international trade. Coe and 
Helpman (1995) and Keller (1998), for example, consider foreign trade as a carrier of 
knowledge and assess the importance of imports in introducing foreign technology into 
domestic production and spurring total factor productivity. The claim is that a country that 
is more open to machinery and equipment imports derives a larger benefit from foreign 
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research and development, it being show empirically that countries that have experienced 
faster growth in total factor productivity have imported more from the world‟s technology 
leaders. 
 Meanwhile, a similar reasoning underlies Benhabib and Spiegel (1994), who focus 
on the role of human capital in economic development and interpret cross-country 
differences in the level of human capital as differences in technology. The results of their 
growth-accounting exercise suggest that the role of human capital in economic growth is 
one of facilitating the adoption of technology from abroad and the creation of appropriate 
domestic technology. This clearly contrasts with studies based on the human-capital-
augmented Solow model (such as in Mankiw, Romer and Weil 1992), which treat human 
capital as a separate factor of production. Mayer (2001) combines these two strands of the 
literature (to wit, foreign trade as a carrier of knowledge and role of human capital in 
economic growth as one of facilitating the adoption of technology) to investigate 
empirically technology transfer to developing countries and its contribution to economic 
growth. In this sense, the paper highlights the importance of trade as a vehicle for 
technological spillovers and attempts to trace the combined role of human capital and 
technology diffusion in growth. The results of the corresponding growth-accounting 
exercise for a sample of 53 developing countries relating productivity differences to 
differences in the stock of human capital and machinery imports suggest a positive and 
statistically strongly significant impact of the combination of machinery imports and the 
stock of human capital on growth during the transition to the steady state. This impact is 
most significant when general-purpose machinery imports are combined with that part of 
the labor force which has a high level of education. An important implication of this 
finding is therefore that the role of human capital in economic growth is best described as 
 5 
affecting the speed of technological adoption from abroad and hence productivity, rather 
than as being an independent factor of production. 
 However, balance-of-payments constraints also influence the adoption of 
investment-specific technological change: if technological progress is embodied in capital 
goods, the ability of underdeveloped countries to absorb foreign technological innovation 
relies on the possibility of import capital goods that are not domestically produced. As a 
result, the paramount importance of exports as a component of demand is that it happens 
to be the only component that can generate the foreign exchange to pay for the import 
content of other components of demand such as investment (Thirlwall 1997). This is 
therefore yet another reason for net exports to feature prominently in the demand side of 
the model developed in this paper. 
 Meanwhile, findings such as that by Collechia and Schreyer (2002) show that not 
only the investment but also its allocation play an important role in harvesting the benefits 
of technical change (especially information and communication technologies) embodied in 
capital goods. That investment allocation plays a central role in the development process 
is not a novelty, though. Several authors such as Bose (1968), Araujo and Teixeira (2002) 
and Araujo (2004), drawing upon Feldman‟s (1928) seminal contribution, have shown that 
investment allocation determines growth in a closed economy. Feldman‟s model might 
therefore be useful to gain further understanding on the contemporary growth experience 
of developing countries, though one of its limitations is that it does not take into account 
technological progress. 
 This paper extends Feldman‟s contribution by incorporating investment-specific 
technological change and human capital into a four sector model in which supply and 
demand interact to endogenously determine growth. The model is a step in the direction of 
furthering the understanding of the role played by both the allocation and accumulation of 
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physical and human capital in a growth dynamics whose main engine is technological 
change, which has important empirical implications. 
 The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides a review of 
the theoretical and empirical literature on investment-specific technological change and 
related issues pertinent to this paper, while Section 3 describes the workings of the supply 
side of the model. The export demand side is described in Section 4, followed then by a 
discussion of a variety of theoretical, empirical and policy implications that can be drawn 
from the growth dynamics implied by model. The closing section summarizes the main 
conclusions derived along the way. 
 
2. Literature on investment-specific technological change and related issues 
 Technical change embodied in the form of new equipment represents phenomena 
such as advances in computer technology, robotization of assembly lines, faster and more 
efficient means of telecommunications, and so on. Given the sector-specific nature of this 
type of technological change, the relative price of new equipment can be used to identify 
the stochastic process driving the technological change. This type of technological 
innovation is different from the usual changes in total factor productivity in which capital 
of different generations is thought of as being the same type of good, or having the same 
cost as previous vintages of capital (i.e. as measured in units of the consumption good). In 
case it is found that investment-specific technological change accounts for a considerable 
fraction of total growth in total factor productivity, it is suggested an important role for 
investment in spurring productivity growth above and beyond its traditional role of capital 
deepening. 
 Greenwood, Hercowitz and Krusell (1997) investigate the role that investment-
specific (or capital-embodied) technological change played in generating postwar U.S. 
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growth, the premise being that the introduction of new, more efficient capital goods is an 
important source of productivity change. Their empirical exercise suggests that it is falling 
real prices for new investment goods associated with investment-specific technical change 
that accounts for most of the observed postwar U.S. growth, with relatively little being left 
over to be explained by other factors, such as total factor productivity. Capital-embodied 
technical change explains close to 60% of the growth in output per hours worked, with 
residual, neutral productivity change then accounting for the remaining 40%. Besides, the 
authors decompose this 60% figure into a direct effect (the increasing quality of given 
flows of investment in consumption units) and an indirect effect (the stimulus for further 
investment in consumption units). They obtain that the direct effect can be accounted 
responsible for 38% of labor productivity growth in the 1947-1994 period, while the 
remaining 22% (adding up to 60%) can be explained by the indirect effect. 
 Hercowitz (1998) reviews the so-called „embodiment‟ controversy between 
Jorgenson and Solow in the 1960s centered on the importance of capital-embodied (or, in 
more recent parlance, investment-specific) technological change. While disembodied 
technical change affects output growth independently of capital accumulation, embodied 
technical change requires investment to do so. Solow (1960) claims that the latter is 
dominant, which implies that investment is the key transmission mechanism of technical 
change to output growth, while Jorgenson (1966) replies that from the data available then, 
one could not obtain an answer regarding the relative importance of both forms of 
technical change. 
 Earlier on, and from a Keynesian viewpoint, Kaldor (1957) had already introduced 
the idea of a technical progress function relating the rate of growth of output per worker to 
the rate of growth of capital per worker. Kaldor claimed that it is not possible to 
distinguish, at least empirically, between movements along a production function (the 
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substitution of capital for labor) and movements in the whole function due to technical 
progress, as the one implies the other. In other words, there cannot be capital deepening 
without some technical progress embodied in the new capital, and most new ideas need 
capital accumulation for their embodiment. Hence the shape of the technical progress 
function depends on the degree to which capital accumulation embodies new techniques 
which improve labor productivity. 
 On the theoretical front, while Greenwood, Hercowitz and Krusell (1997) do not 
explicitly model the mechanism by which the real price of capital falls, Krusell (1998) 
develops an early model in which the price of capital falls due to some endogenous R&D. 
In the same vein, Huffman (2007) develops an alternative model in which the changing 
real price of capital is driven by endogenous research spending. Growth takes place 
through investment-specific technical change, which in turn is determined endogenously 
through research spending, with the degree of substitutability between research spending 
and new capital construction playing an important role in conditioning the main results of 
the model. Hendricks (2000), meanwhile, develops a model of growth through technology 
adoption featuring the complementarities between technologies, which are embodied in 
capital goods, and skills that are in turn embodied in workers. Learning by workers and 
technological adoption by firms are complementary in the sense that the level of available 
labor experience limits the sophistication of capital goods firms can use in production, 
while the capital vintages in use determine the learning rate. The model successfully 
accounts for the major empirical relationships between growth rates, equipment 
investment shares and relative equipment prices detected in postwar U.S. data by the 
literature on investment-specific technological change. 
 Collechia and Schreyder (2002), meanwhile, aim at quantifying the contribution of 
information and communication technologies to output growth in the past two decades in 
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the U.S. and in eight other OECD countries. They find that, despite differences between 
countries, the U.S. has not been alone in benefiting from the positive effects of capital 
investment in the form of information and communication technologies on economic 
growth. Besides, they find that diffusion and usage of information and communication 
technologies play a key role which depends on the right framework conditions, not 
necessarily on the existence of a large sector producing information and communication 
technologies. As it turns out, allocation of this kind of capital-embodied technological 
change matters. Generally, there is no discernible systematic relationship between the size 
of the industry producing information and communication technologies and the 
contribution of this kind of technical change to output growth. Indeed, although technical 
advances in information and communication technologies are available almost universally, 
the degree of uptake and use of them in production has varied across OECD countries. 
With broadly similar changes in relative prices, a question that arises is what explains this 
variation, and allocational differences emerge as a plausible explanation. Although it is 
likely that there are other reasons, differences in economic structure (for instance, different 
shares of industries producing, and intensive in, information and communication 
technologies) can arguably be seen as playing a role as explanatory factors behind 
differences in the uptake and diffusion of new technologies between OECD countries. 
 In the same vein, Cummins and Violante (2002) measure technical change at the 
asset, industry and aggregate level in the U.S. from 1947 to 2000 and find that 
technological improvement in equipment and software accounts for an important fraction 
of output growth and plays a key role in the productivity resurgence of the 1990s. More 
precisely, improvement in the quality of equipment and software explains about 20% of 
growth in the U.S. in the postwar period and about 30% of growth in the 1990s. Besides, 
they find that 60% of labor productivity growth in the postwar period comes from 
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technological advances in equipment and software. Sakellaris and Wilson (2004) estimate 
the rate of embodied technological change directly from plant-level manufacturing data on 
production, input and investment decisions along with histories on their vintages of 
equipment investment, with the preferred estimate being 12% for the typical U.S. 
manufacturing plant during the years 1972-1996, with the contribution of embodied 
technological change to total technological change being about two thirds. 
 More recently, Bakhshi and Larsen (2005) use an adaptation of Greenwood, 
Hercowitz and Krusell (1997) and find that technological change specific to the 
information and communication technology sector accounts for around 20-30% of long-
run labor productivity growth in the United Kingdom. Meanwhile, Ho (2008) used panel 
data relative to a sample of 4-digit U.S. manufacturing industries from 1974 to 1994 to 
examine the impact of investment-specific technological change on labor composition in 
U.S. manufacturing industries from 1974 to 1994. The author shows that investment-
specific technological change increases the relative demand of non-production (skilled) 
workers to production workers, while total factor productivity growth does not change 
labor composition. Marquis and Trehan (2008), in turn, disputes the identification by 
Greenwood, Hercowitz and Krusell (1997) of the relative price of (new) capital with 
capital-specific technological change by claiming that, in a two-sector growth model, the 
relative price of capital equals the ratio of the productivity processes in the two sectors, 
though. Restrictions from this model are then used with data on wages and prices by 
Marquis and Trehan (2008) to construct measures of productivity growth and test the 
identification made by Greenwood, Hercowitz and Krusell (1997), which turns out to be 
strongly rejected by the data. In case this result proves correct, it may imply that the 
relative price of capital cannot be used in isolation to draw inferences about the 
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contribution of capital-specific technical change to either economic growth or to output 
fluctuations. 
 
3. Production structure and aggregate supply 
Let us assume that the economy is divided in two groups of sectors: the first is a 
more traditional group and comprises sectors 1 and 2, while the second is a newly 
advanced group (a sort of New Economy, let us say) and comprises sectors 3 and 4. 
Sectors 1 and 2 are modeled according to Feldman‟s (1928) contribution, with the capital 
goods sector being denoted by subscript 1, and the non-durable consumption goods sector 
being denoted by subscript 2. Capital goods are used by sectors 1 and 2, but once 
investment is made, capital goods cannot be transferred from one sector to the other 
(irreversibility assumption). A proportion  of the current production of the capital goods 
sector is allocated to itself while the remaining, 1-, is allocated to sector 2, with 1    
0. The technology of production is Leontief in both sectors: 
1 1 1 1 1min[ , ]Y A K B L      (1) 
 2 2 2 2 2min ,Y A K B L     (2) 
where 1Y  stands for the production of capital goods, 1A  is the corresponding output-capital 
ratio and 1K  refers to the stock of capital in the investment sector. L1 stands for the 
unskilled labor force employed in sector 1 and B1 is the corresponding output-labor ratio. 
Meanwhile, 2Y  refers to the production of the non-durable consumption good, 2A  is the 
corresponding output-capital ratio and 2K  denotes the capital stock in the non-durable 
consumption goods sector. The amount of unskilled labor force in this sector is denoted by 
L2, while B2 is the corresponding output-labor ratio. Following Feldman‟s original 
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contribution, unskilled labor is always in excess supply in both sectors. The production in 
these sectors is given by: 
1 1 1Y A K       (3) 
2 2 2Y A K       (4) 
The law of motion of the stock of capital in sectors 1 and 2 is therefore given by: 
   1 1 1( ) ( ) ( )K t Y t K t       (5) 
    2 1 21 ( ) ( ) ( )K t Y t K t        (6) 
Sectors 1 and 2 are vertically integrated, and in case they were the only sectors of the 
economy, the growth rate of the consumption sector would depend on the growth rate of 
the investment sector and, in the long run, the former would converges to later, which 
would then be the growth rate of the economy as a whole (Araujo and Teixeira 2002, p. 
253). In this paper there are two other newly advanced sectors, though, so that the growth 
rate of the capital goods sector is obtained by dividing both sides of equation (5) by K1 and 
noting that 1 1 1Y A K . Hence 
1
1
1
Y
A
Y
    and 2 1
2
lim
t
Y
A
Y
 

  . 
As intimated earlier, the newly advanced economy is comprised by sectors 3 and 4, 
which produce, respectively, a durable consumption good and human capital. The two 
most common views associated with the so-called New Economy are that it is either 
limited to a few sectors or widespread throughout the economy. According to Gordon 
(2000, p. 72), who is referring to the American economy, “[t]he New Economy has 
created a dynamic explosion of productivity growth in the durable manufacturing sector 
(…). However the New Economy has meant little to the 88 percent of the economy 
outside durable manufacturing”. Following this interpretation let us assume that even 
though information and communication technology, for instance, is a general purpose 
technology (Jorgenson and Stiroh 2000), it happens to be adopted only in sectors 3 and 4. 
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Nonetheless, skilled labor force is required to the mastery of this technology, and several 
authors have argued that information and communication technologies and skills are 
complementary and not substitutes as traditional models have it. Acemoglu (2002), for 
instance, alongside with other authors alluded to in the previous sections, points out that 
the bias of the technical change is mainly determined by the qualification of the available 
labor force. Consequently, a high proportion of skilled workers in the labor force implies a 
large market size for skill-complementary technologies, and hence encourages faster 
upgrading of the productivity of skilled workers. A possible way to incorporate this 
complementarity between skills and information and communication technologies is to 
assume that sector 3 produces durable consumption goods by using a Leontief technology: 
3 3 3 3 3min[ , ]
eY A K B H     (7) 
where 3 3H hL  is the amount of human capital employed in this sector, which is given by 
the average per capita human capital of the skilled worker, h, multiplied by the number of 
worker in this sector L3. Meanwhile, 3
eK  stands for the stock of equipments installed in the 
durable consumption goods sector and A3 and B3 measure the efficiency, respectively, of 
equipments and human capital. Sector 4 increases the human capital of the economy and 
also uses a Leontief production function with both equipments and human capital as 
inputs. Assuming that 4H  refers to the stock of human capital in the educational sector, its 
production, denoted by Y4, is given by: 
4 4 4 4 4min[ , ]
eY A K B H     (8) 
where 4
eK  is the stock of equipments in sector 4 and A4 and B4 measures the efficiency of 
equipments and human capital, respectively. As far as constraints are concerned, there are 
two possibilities here. The first one is that the production of sectors 3 and 4 is bounded by 
the existing stock of equipments. Although this case is possible it is not the most probable 
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one since, following Solow (1957, 1962), the efficiency of equipments is assumed to have 
an exponential growth.
1
 In this case small amounts of equipments may be compensated by 
increasing levels of embodied technological change. The possibility that the production in 
sectors 3 and 4 is bounded by the existing level of human capital in each of the sectors has 
greater support in the literature, in which the lack of skills has been pointed out as one of 
the main constraints to the adoption of new technologies, as reported in the preceding 
sections. Hence we assume that: 
3 3 3Y B H       (9) 
4 4 4Y B H       (10) 
Note that 4 3 4Y H H  , meaning that the production of sector 4 is equal to the total 
investment in human capital carried out in the economy, so that 
4 4 s sB H hL hL  , with 
3 4sL L L  . Part of this investment, shL , is allocated to endow the new skilled workers 
with the average level of existing human capital. The remaining part, 
shL , meanwhile, 
raises the average level of human capital of the skilled labor force as a whole. Given that 
i i iH hL hL  , with i = 3,4, we can write: 
4 4 3 4 3 4( ) ( )B H h L L h L L       (11) 
Let us assume that the population, L, grows at a rate n and that the share of skilled 
population in sectors 3 and 4 remains constant through time. By dividing both sides of 
expression (7) by Ls and denoting by 
4
s
L
L
  the share of the skilled labor force that is 
employed in the educational sector we obtain after some algebraic manipulation the 
growth rate of human capital of the typical skilled worker: 
4
h
B n
h
        (12) 
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It is then possible to show that the growth rate of the stock of human capital in sector 3 is 
given by 
3 3 3 4 3 3 4 3( ) ( )H hL hL B n hL hnL B H       . Hence tBHtH 433 exp)0()(  . 
By adopting the same procedure in relation to the stock of human capital in sector 4 we 
obtain that tBHtH 444 exp)0()(  . Hence the growth rate of the output in sectors 3 and 4 
is given by 4B  . Note that sectors 3 and 4 are vertically integrated since the output of 
sector 4 is an input for sector 3 and for itself. Following Feldman‟s tradition, therefore, it 
is intuitive that these sectors share the same growth rate in the long run. 
 
4. Export demand side 
Let us consider the following standard demand function for exports: 
d
f
P
X Z
EP


 
   
 
     (13) 
where X is the volume of exports, Pd is the domestic price of exports, E is the nominal 
exchange rate, Pf is the foreign price of imports,   is the price elasticity of the demand for 
exports, with 0  , while   is the income elasticity of demand for exports, 0  . 
Assuming that relative prices measured in a common currency are constant, so that 
purchasing power parity holds, expression (13) yields: 
X Z
X Z
       (14) 
4.1 First scenario 
Let us first consider that the economy exports only the non-durable consumption 
good, which has an income elasticity of demand given by 2 . Hence exports are a fraction 
of the production of the non-durable consumption goods sector. Assuming that a constant 
fraction,  , of the production of the non-durable consumption goods sector is exported, 
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2X Y , while the remaining fraction, 1  , is consumed internally, D2 =(1– γ)Y2, the 
growth rate of the production of the consumption goods sector has to be equal to: 
2
2
2
2 )1(
D
D
X
X
Y
Y 
      (15) 
Let us assume that the growth rate of international income is exogenously given by 
( ) eZ Z r  and that the growth of rate of internal demand for the consumption good 2 is 
given by g2. Equation (15) then implies that the growth rate of demand for the production 
of sector 2 is given by: 
22
2
2 )1( gr
Y
Y
e  

    (16) 
However, equation (6) implies that, in the long run, the feasible growth rate of the 
production of consumption goods is given by : 
2
1
2
Y
A
Y
        (17) 
Given the condition that the growth rates expressed by equations (16) and (17) have to be 
equal, we can obtain *, the fraction of the current production of capital goods that has to 
be used in the capital goods sector to meet the demand requirements, which is given by: 
1
22 )1(*
A
gre 

     (18) 
The share of capital goods allocated to the production of capital goods is thus positively 
related to the rates of growth of export demand, internal demand and depreciation, and 
negatively related to the output-capital ratio in the investment sector. As in this scenario it 
is assumed that durable consumption goods are not exported, let us further assume that the 
growth rate of the demand for these goods is given by: 
3
3
i
Y
r n
Y
        (19) 
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where ri is the growth rate of per capita demand for durable consumption goods and n is 
the growth rate of population. Equation (19) is therefore a natural rate of growth of 
demand as defined by Pasinetti (1993). However, the feasible growth rate of the supply of 
durable consumption goods is given by: 
3
4
3
H
B
H
       (20) 
Given the condition that the growth rates expressed by equations (19) and (20) have to be 
equal, we can obtain * , the share of the skilled labor force that has to be allocated to the 
educational sector, which is given by: 
4
* i
r n
B


       (21) 
The share of the skilled labor force that has to be allocated to the educational sector is 
therefore positively (negatively) related to the natural rate of growth of demand for 
durable consumption goods (efficiency of human capital in the educational sector). 
Meanwhile, the intertemporal equilibrium in the balance of payments, which is 
given by f dMP E P X , requires, under purchasing power parity, M X . Given that 
2X Y , we obtain 2M Y , though. In the long run, it follows that 2 1 2( * )Y A Y    
and hence that 2222 ])1([ KAgrM e  
 , so that imports are given by: 
 dtKAgrM e 2222 ])1([     (22) 
As in the long run it follows that *)]()1(exp[*)()( 2222 ttgrtKtK e   , substitution 
of this expression into equation (22) and calculation of the integral yields: 
 cttgrtKAM e  *)]()1(exp[*)( 2222   (23) 
where c is a constant. By evaluating equation (23) at t* we conclude that in case 
( *) ( *)M t X t , it then follows that c is equal to zero and equation (23) sums up to 
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 *)]()1(exp[*)( 2222 ttgrtKAM e   . Therefore, it is being assumed that each 
vintage of capital goods is the result of investment – or imports – plus the production of 
the sector 3, which is specialized in producing equipments, in period v, having a rate of 
embodied technological change given by m and a rate of depreciation given by .2 We 
then obtain: 
)](exp[)]()([),( 3 tvmvvYvMtvK e      (24) 
The stock of equipments in this economy is thus given by the integral over the ages of 
different vintages of capital goods that are installed in this sector, which is in turn given 
by: 
 
tt
ee dvtvmvvYvMdvtvKtK
0
3
0
)](exp[)]()([),()(    (25) 
By differentiating both sides of this expression and applying the Fundamental Theorem of 
Calculus we obtain that the variation in the stock of equipments in sector 1 is given by: 
)(exp)]()([)( 3 tKmttYtMtK ee 
   (26) 
from which it follows that the change in the stock of the equipments is given by: 
3( )e eK q M Y K       (27) 
where mttq exp)(   conveys the investment specific nature of technological change. In 
order to provide a fully characterization of the dynamic path of the stock of equipments in 
this economy it is necessary to consider the demand side to determine the value of M. As 
it turns out, we obtain the following dynamic path to the stock of equipments for t>t*: 
 





223
332222
)1(
exp)exp()0(*)]()1(exp[*)(
)(
gr
mttnrHBttgrtKA
tK iee           (28) 
Meanwhile, the dynamic path of the stock of capital in sectors 1 and 2, respectively, is 
given by: 
tgrKtK e ])1(exp[)0()( 2211      (29) 
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and 
*)]()1(exp[)0()( 2222 ttgrKtK e      (30) 
In order to analyze the performance of the economy let us reproduce the dynamic 
path of the production of each sector below: 
tgrYtY e ])1(exp[)0()( 2211                                 (31)           
 
*)]()1(exp[*)()( 2222 ttgrttYtY e                  (32)
 
tgYtY 333 exp)0()(                                                      (33)
 
tgYtY 444 exp)0()(                                                      (34) 
As it turns out, the growth rates of sectors 1 and 2 depend on 2 2(1 )er g    , 
which is nothing but a convex combination of the growth rate of external and internal 
demand. The growth path of the group of traditional sectors is therefore positively related 
to the growth rate of exports. Besides, the higher the fraction of the production of non-
durable consumption goods that is exported, the stronger the impact of a change in the 
growth rate of exports on the growth rates of the production of both non-durable 
consumption and capital goods. Meanwhile, the rate of growth of the newly advanced 
sectors, which form the so-called New Economy, are both given by the growth rate of the 
production of durable consumption goods, which is exogenously given at a natural level. 
Though only these newly advanced sectors employ imported equipments in their 
production, their shared growth rate does not depend on the export performance of the 
economy, the reason being that production in these sectors is constrained ultimately by the 
existing stock of human capital rather than the existing stock of equipments and only non-
durable consumption goods are exported. Meanwhile, the shared growth rate of the 
traditional sectors does depend on the growth rate of exports, even though they do not 
employ imported equipments in production. 
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4.2 Second scenario 
Let us now suppose that the economy exports only durable consumption goods, 
whose income elasticity of export demand, 3 , is higher than the income elasticity of 
export demand for non-durable consumption goods, so that 3 2  . Hence exports are 
now a fraction of the production of the durable consumption goods sector. Assuming that 
a fixed share,  , of the production of the durable consumption goods is exported, 
3X Y , while the remaining share, 1  , is consumed internally, D3 =(1 – ξ)Y3, the rate 
of growth of the production of the consumption goods sector has to be equal to: 
3
3
3
3 )1(
D
D
X
X
Y
Y 
      (35) 
Let us assume again that the growth rate of international income is exogenously 
given by ( ) eZ Z r . Equation (35) then implies that the growth rate of demand for the 
production of sector 3 is given by: 
33
3
3 )1( gr
Y
Y
e  

    (36) 
However, the long-run feasible growth rate of the production of durable consumption 
goods is given by : 
3
4
3
Y
B n
Y
       (37) 
Given the condition that the growth rates expressed by equations (36) and (37) have to be 
equal, we can obtain * , the share of the skilled labor force that has to be allocated to the 
educational sector, which is given by: 
4
33 )1(*
B
ngre 

     (38) 
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The share of the skilled labor force that has to be allocated to the educational sector is thus 
positively (negatively) related to the rate of growth of export demand (efficiency of human 
capital in the educational sector). As the production of non-durable consumption good is 
now consumed internally, the growth rate of the supply of capital goods adopted to 
produce non-durable consumption goods is given by equation (15), while the growth rate 
of the demand is given by the natural rate, ri + n. Hence the value of * that equilibrates 
supply and demand is given by:  
1
* i
r n
A


 
      (39) 
The share of capital goods allocated to the production of capital goods is now positively 
related to the rates of natural growth of demand and depreciation, and negatively related to 
the output-capital ratio in the investment sector. 
 Meanwhile, the intertemporal equilibrium in the balance of payments, given by 
f dMP E P X , requires, under purchasing power parity, M X . As 3X Y , we obtain 
3M Y , though. In the long run, it follows that 3 4 3( * )Y B n Y   and hence that 
3333 ])1([ HBgrM e  
 , so that imports are given by: 
 dttHBgrM e )(])1([ 3333     (40) 
As in the long run it follows that 3 3 3( ) (0)exp eH t H r t , substituting this expression into 
equation (40) and calculating the integral we obtain: 
 ctgrHBM e  ])1(exp[)0( 3333    (41) 
where c is a constant. By evaluating equation (41) at time zero we obtain that the value of 
this constant is given by 
(0)
1
(0)
M
c
X
  . By assuming that (0) (0)M X , in turn, we obtain 
c = 0 and equation (41) reduces to tgrHBM e ])1(exp[)0( 3333   . The stock of 
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equipments in this economy is thus given by the integral over the ages of different 
vintages of capital goods that are installed in this sector, which is in turn given by: 
  
tt
ee dvtvmvvYvMdvtvKtK
0
3
0
)](exp[)]()1()([),()(    (42) 
By differentiating both sides of this expression and applying the Fundamental Theorem of 
Calculus we obtain that the variation in the stock of equipments in sector 1 is given by: 
)(exp)]()1()([)( 3 tKmttYtMtK ee  
   (43) 
from which it follows that the change in the stock of the equipments is now given by: 
3[ (1 ) ]e eK q M Y K        (44) 
Recalling that tgrHBM e ])1(exp[)0( 3333    and that 3 3 3 4(0)exp( * )Y B H B n  , 
with ))1((* 433 Bngre   , we obtain tgrHBtY e ])1(exp[)0()( 33333   . 
Substitution of the latter in eq. (44) yields eee KtgrHqBK   ])1(exp[)0( 3333
 , 
while evaluation of this expression in steady state yields: 
 tmgr
nr
HB
tK e
i
e 

 33
33 )1(exp
)0(
)( 

   
(45) 
The dynamic paths of the stocks of capital goods in sectors 1 and 2 are given by: 
    tnrKtK i )exp()0()( 11      (46) 
    *))(exp()0()( 22 ttnrKtK i     (47) 
In order to analyze the performance of the economy let us summarize the dynamic path of 
the production of each sector below:  
tnrYtY i )exp()0()( 11                                          (48) 
*))(exp(*)()( 22 ttnrttYtY i                           (49) 
tgrYtY e ])1(exp[)0()( 3333                           (50) 
tgrYtY e ])1(exp[)0()( 3344                           (51) 
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As it turns out, sectors 1 and 2 have a shared growth rate that is exogenously given 
at a natural level, while the newly advanced sectors that comprise the so-called New 
Economy have a shared growth rate which is equal to the rate of growth of exports. 
Intuitively, it is precisely because only durable consumption goods are exported and only 
the newly advanced sectors employ imported equipments in production that it is only the 
New Economy‟s growth rate which is influenced by the rate of growth of exports. 
Nonetheless, though only part of the production of the durable consumption goods sector 
is exported and only the newly advanced sectors use imported equipments in production, 
the shared growth rate of these sectors does not depend on either some income elasticity of 
imports or the fraction of the production of durables consumption goods which is 
exported, it being actually equal to the growth rate of exports. However, in this scenario 
the performance of the sector which produces human capital is directly linked to the 
export performance of the economy, with an increase in the growth rate of exports then 
requiring the allocation of a higher fraction of the skilled labor force to the human capital 
producing sector. Since there is an upper bound for the share of the skilled labor force 
which can be allocated to the production of itself, an export-led growth of the newly 
advanced sectors – and, by extension, of the economy – is likewise bounded. 
 
5. Conclusion 
 There has been considerable research devoted to enhance our understanding of the 
mechanisms that influence economic growth, though not many of them explore carefully 
how demand and supply forces interact to determine growth dynamics. There is also 
plenty of evidence that technological change comes largely in the form of advances in the 
manner that capital is produced. Meanwhile, investment sectoral allocation plays quite 
crucial a role in harvesting the benefits of investment-specific technological change, with 
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human capital sectoral allocation in turn mattering for technological adoption and 
diffusion as well. 
 This paper contributes to the literature on growth dynamics by seeking to join these 
lines of research on structural factors in a more fully specified framework, on the one 
hand, and by making this more inclusive supply side to interact with demand factors in a 
model of export-led growth, on the other hand. Arguably, balance-of-payments constraints 
also influence the adoption of investment-specific technological change which requires the 
import of capital goods, and this is yet another reason for exports to feature prominently in 
the demand side of the model developed in this paper. As turns out, the sectoral allocation 
of physical and human capital is revealed to be crucial for the resulting growth dynamics. 
 The economy is divided in two groups of sectors. The first group is a traditional 
one and comprises two sectors which produce, respectively, a non-durable consumption 
good and a capital good. The second is a newly advanced group and comprises two sectors 
which produce, respectively, a durable consumption good (which can be used as 
information and communication technology) and human capital. Though information and 
communication technology is a general purpose technology, it is used only in the newly 
advanced sectors and skilled labor is required to the master it. 
 In a first scenario, in which only non-durable consumption goods are exported, the 
share of capital goods which has to be allocated to the production of capital goods varies 
positively with the rates of growth of export demand and depreciation, and negatively with 
the output-capital ratio in the investment sector. Meanwhile, the share of the skilled labor 
supply that has to be allocated to the human capital producing sector varies positively with 
the natural rate of growth of demand for durable consumption goods, and negatively with 
the efficiency of human capital in the educational sector. Besides, the traditional sectors 
share a growth rate which is a convex combination of the growth rate of external and 
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internal demand, and the higher the fraction of the production of non-durable consumption 
goods that is exported, the stronger the impact of a change in the growth rate of exports on 
the shared growth rates of these traditional sectors. Though the traditional sectors do not 
employ imported equipments in their production, the shared growth rate of these sectors 
depends on the growth rate of exports. The growth rates of the newly advanced sectors, in 
turn, are both given by the growth rate of the production of durable consumption goods, 
which is exogenously given at a natural level. Though only these newly advanced sectors 
employ imported equipments in their production, their shared growth rate does not depend 
on the export performance of the economy, since production in these sectors is constrained 
by the existing stock of human capital and exports include only non-durable consumption 
goods. 
In a second scenario, in which only durable consumption goods are exported, the 
share of the skilled labor force that has to be allocated to the educational sector varies 
positively with the rate of growth of export demand, and negatively with the efficiency of 
human capital in this sector. As the production of non-durable consumption good is now 
entirely consumed internally, the share of capital goods which has to be allocated to the 
production of capital goods varies positively with the rates of natural growth of demand 
and depreciation, and negatively with the output-capital ratio in the capital goods sector. 
Meanwhile, the traditional sectors have a shared growth rate that is exogenously given at a 
natural level, while the newly advanced sectors have a shared growth rate which is equal 
to the rate of growth of exports. Intuitively, it is precisely because exports include only 
durable consumption goods and newly advanced sectors are the only ones that employ 
imported equipments in their production that it is only the growth rate of the newly 
advanced sectors that comes to be influenced by the growth rate of exports. Nonetheless, 
though exports include only part of the production of the durable consumption goods 
 26 
sector and newly advanced sectors are the only ones that employ imported equipments in 
production, the shared growth rate of these sectors does not depend on either some income 
elasticity of imports or the fraction of the production of durables consumption goods 
which is exported, it being actually equal to the growth rate of exports. However, in this 
scenario the performance of the sector which produces human capital is directly linked to 
the export performance of the economy, with an increase in the growth rate of exports 
then requiring the allocation of a higher fraction of the skilled labor force to the human 
capital producing sector. Since there is an upper bound for the share of the skilled labor 
force which can be allocated to the production of itself, an export-led growth of the newly 
advanced sectors – and, by extension, of the economy – is likewise bounded. 
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1
 This result is demonstrated in the next section. 
2
 This formulation follows Solow (1957, 1962). An alternative approach would be to model 
investment-specific technological change as a Markov process, as in Greenwood, Hercowitz & 
Krusell (1997). 
